Three obstacles to Turkey’s ambitions of becoming a regional power

Turkey marked its 100th anniversary as a modern state just a year ago. Today, its prospects—and many of its actions—are complex and unpredictable.

The country operates on multiple fronts, often forming and dissolving alliances overnight. Yet, during Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s two decades in power, Turkey has managed to establish itself as a significant, albeit authoritarian and sometimes inconsistent, regional power with growing influence. This has been achieved despite numerous internal challenges and shortcomings, particularly in the economic sphere.

However, Turkey’s influence is constrained, as its reputation has taken a hit, according to Nilgün Arisan Eralp, Director of the Centre for European Union Studies at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV), in an interview with Phileleftheros.

Eralp was in Cyprus to participate in the 5th Cyprus Forum.

She noted that “its image has been stained by its support for Muslim brotherhood /Sunni Islam which angered the ruling elites of the countries in the region. Also, its stalled EU accession process, backsliding in the universal values demanded by the people who took to the streets during the uprisings in the Arab world and the fragile economy resulted in the loss of credibility in the region as a whole”.

Tensions with Cyprus and Greece further complicate the situation. The Turkish analyst acknowledges the differences between these parties but stresses that these disputes are a barrier to potential economic cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially concerning hydrocarbon resources. Some suggest that resolving the Cyprus issue is a prerequisite for regional collaboration. However, initiating cooperation is essential, as these challenges seem unlikely to be resolved without a regional approach.

In what way does the conflict between Israel and Hamas affect Turkey?

Hamas’s attacks and Israel’s response have come as Turkey had been trying to improve ties with key Western and regional states for a host of reasons, not the least being to attract desperately needed foreign capital to overcome its acute economic crisis.

Although Turkey had initially used cautious language and adopted a tone of de-escalation at the beginning in the hope that it could play a mediation role, later there has been a great disillusionment regarding Europe’s refusal to support a ceasefire in Gaza & Western countries’ unconditional support forIsrael. As Israel’s attacks on Gaza intensified and the humanitarian crisis became dire, diminishing any prospect for a diplomatic resolution, Ankara’s language toughened vis-a-vis the West and Israel.

The official pro-Hamas discourse of Turkey, not accepting Hamas as a terrorist organisation and claiming that it is a liberation group has worsened the country’s relations with the West. This has had negative political and economic implications.

Consequently, Turkey has failed to secure an international role in the Israel-Hamas war. On the other hand, the crisis has been used in domestic politics both by the administration and the opposition. In Turkey sympathy for Palestinians and contempt for Israel is widespread. While the government’s pro-Hamas stance strengthened its voter base, the opposition, especially in the last local elections, has made use of the ongoing trade relations with Israel. After the local elections, the government has put an end to the direct trade with Israel.

How do you view Turkey’s role in the broader Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean?

Turkey has long been searching for a role in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Although it has the potential to have such a role,  the developments in the past prevented that from being materialised.

Right after the Arab uprisings Turkey had been regarded as a “model” or rather a source of inspiration for the countries in the region. Its -though far from perfect democratic credentials, being a secular country where the majority of the population is Muslim, its economic strength and finally its active EU accession process had played a role in this. However, in time this image has been stained by its support for Muslim brotherhood /Sunni Islam which angered the ruling elites of the countries in the region. Also, its stalled EU accession process, backsliding in the universal values demanded by the people who took to the streets during the uprisings in the Arab world and the fragile economy resulted in the loss of credibility in the region as a whole.

Still, Turkey is popular in the eyes of the people in the region, especially in North Africa yet this has not been translated into an influential regional power.

Regarding the Eastern Mediterranean, opting for gunboat diplomacy instead of international law which justifies some of the claims of Turkey, antagonised the littoral states in the region and resulted in the exclusion of the country from the multilateral framework in the region like East Mediterranean Gas Forum. This exclusion had further hardened Turkey’s stance in the region.

Recently Turkey has been trying to mend ties with the countries in the region to put an end to its regional isolation that has had various negative repercussions for the country. However, still, it is not a strong power in the region that can influence the course of events.

Do you believe that its accession process to the European Union is likely to happen, or that this possibility no longer exists?

Although the process of accession negotiations has not been officially suspended, it has been de facto frozen via the European Council Decision in June 2018. However, none of the parties is willing to pull the plug.

Hence Turkey is still an official candidate, albeit not a real candidate anymore, also it is far from being a strategic partner. As referred to by some EU officials it is now being qualified as an unavoidable partner.

The main factors influencing the EU in this direction have been the following:

• Strong demand/need to have sustainable stability and security in the East Mediterranean surrounded by a “ring of fire”;
• It’s unsolved migrant/refugee problem.

Certainly, the strategic importance of Turkey plays an important role in the EU’s interest to engage with the country, although its unpredictable foreign policy weakens this strategic importance.

None of the parties is willing to reinvigorate the accession process in the short term. Although both sides want to form some kind of engagement via cooperation, there is an absence of strategic outlook on both sides. As Sinem Adar from CATS once stated “Both parties seem to be sleepwalking without a compass”. There is a definite need to have a sober discussion regarding how to cooperate and find a working relationship towards building a peaceful future in a shared neighbourhood.

Like the EU, Türkiye also wants to have a transactional and compartmentalised relationship with the EU, mainly for economic reasons and to some extent to enhance its regional power.

However, what Türkiye wants from the EU is a “no strings attached cooperation”.

The main problem between the parties is a lack of trust. For the alleviation of this huge problem, Turkey has to stop moving away from universal values, in politics, in the judiciary and in the economic sphere. The EU on the other hand has to close the gap between the rhetoric and practice which has widened recently.

Consequently, accession is an illusion in the short and most probably in the medium term. However, in the long run, depending on many factors it might again become a possibility.

What are the most significant domestic problems that Turkey is facing today?

The most significant problems that Turkey is facing are economic, namely a declining growth rate, high inflation together with decreasing foreign direct investment, and a private sector with large foreign currency liabilities.

The second most significant domestic problem is the backsliding in universal values and the polarisation in Turkish society.

Turkey does not hide its ambitions to become a regional power. Is this achievable, and how can it be done?

Turkey has aspired to become a regional power for some time. However, its strained relations with the countries in the region until recently and its fragile economic situation prevent it from becoming one. Furthermore not having a competitive power in energy and technology further prevents it from becoming an influential regional power.

How do geopolitical factors, such as the conflict in Syria or tensions with Greece and Cyprus, impact Turkey’s economic growth?

The growth of the Turkish economy is surely affected by geopolitical factors and especially the crises surrounding it: Russian aggression in Ukraine, the war in Gaza, the recent Israel-Lebanon war and the Syrian conflict. Apart from the doubts regarding the state of the rule of law, these conflicts negatively affect the external flow of funds, especially direct investment inflows for whom economic security matters a lot.

However, the conflicts with Greece and Cyprus are not influential in the declining growth rate. These conflicts were there even when the growth rate of the Turkish economy was relatively high.

Currently, due to the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, the conflicts between the parties have been subdued. On the other hand, the “Cyprus problem” is being regarded as a frozen, non-violent conflict, providing kind of a “comfort zone” for the international community and the investors. Since 1974, except for sporadic incidents, there has been no violence on the island. Paradoxically and perhaps not it is the relative calm on the island and satisfaction with the status quo that makes a solution so elusive.

Is an energy cooperation between Turkey and Cyprus possible, particularly in the context of natural gas exploration and development in the Eastern Mediterranean?

Former Disy leader Averof Neophytou stated that “the exploitation of the natural gas deposits, the pipelines, the electricity interconnectors, the terminal stations and everything….would constantly be postponed for the future as long as the Cyprus problem is not solved.”

Unfortunately, realism has always been an excuse for second-best solutions.

There is an objective reality in the Eastern Mediterranean which is interdependence. Some people argue that there is a need for progress in the solution of the so-called Cyprus problem for regional cooperation. However we have to start from somewhere,  problems do not seem to be solved without regional cooperation.

Russian aggression in Ukraine has intensified the need for energy and energy security in the region. Natural gas is still very important. Three weeks prior to the Russian invasion, the EU classified natural gas as bridge fuels for the short term.

There are natural gas resources in the region and Turkey in the region with its proximity to the market, availability of LNG terminals and pipelines connecting Turkey to the EU has a great potential to transmit the gas to Europe.

Unfortunately, maritime disputes and non-recognition seem to prevent energy cooperation. However, a pragmatic way can be found. Although the current situation is exactly the opposite, I would like to remind the maritime deal between Lebanon and Israel back in October 2022, when they had no diplomatic relations. The main actors then were not states but energy companies. In the case of cooperation in gas exploration between Cyprus and Turkey in addition to business associations, the EU also can play a vital role in financing energy cooperation projects in the region.

I agree with Andreas Mavroyiannis who claimed that (approximately a year ago in a panel discussion on second-track diplomacy) Jean Monnet’s statement is valid for the Eastern Mediterranean: “There are organic conditions of peace in the region” and these are the necessity to cooperate based on the interdependence.

At least on a verbal level, relations between Turkey and Greece have normalised recently. Could the two countries be led to a process of resolving their differences, or will we see tensions rise again?

It is not easy to make an exact prediction on this. Neither of the parties has been willing to tackle core issues (like cooperation of security forces against migrant smugglers, religious freedom of minorities and the Cyprus issue) at the moment. It seems that they currently prioritise stability over discussion on high-level issues.

Hence they talk about cooperation in the areas of economy, trade, tourism, culture and sports that would foster mutual trust.

However, in the last UN General Assembly Mitsotakis and Erdoğan surprised us by announcing their decision to take a step to resolve their decades-old disagreement on issues related to maritime borders. The decision was made public a few days after Greek coastguard boats were seen violating Turkish territorial waters off Bodrum and Datça to pursue migrant smugglers, two incidents over which Turkey remained silent. Turkey opted to downplay the incidents before the meeting between Erdoğan and Mitsotakis. These all can lead us to be modestly optimistic.

Nevertheless, although such a decision was made public it is not yet certain whether the parties can make concrete progress in the contentious area of maritime disputes. Thus one can say that without addressing the core issues of the relationship, it is likely that the countries would be led to new cycles of crisis.

What is the current situation in Turkey regarding human rights, democracy, and the rule of law? Why is the country receiving so much criticism on these issues?

There has been serious backsliding in Turkey regarding human rights, democracy and the rule of law

 

Source: Three obstacles to Turkey’s ambitions of becoming a regional power | in-cyprus.com (philenews.com)